Electoral violence is a serious threat to free and fair elections. Theoretical explanations of electoral violence increasingly move beyond simplified incumbent-opposition dichotomies, and yet, there is a lack of nuanced actor data needed to test such explanations. This special data feature introduces the Modes and Agents of Election-Related Violence in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya (MAVERICK) dataset, an actor-centered georeferenced event report dataset on electoral violence. MAVERICK includes 2,200 electoral violence events in Côte d’Ivoire (1995–2022) and Kenya (1992–2022), covering all multiparty elections since the (re)introduction of democracy in the 1990s. MAVERICK’s granular information on actor characteristics, affiliations, and roles, as well as added indicators of violence intensity, makes the dataset ideal for developing and testing nuanced theories on the causes, dynamics, and consequences of electoral violence. The article introduces the conceptual and operational definitions used, outlines the data structure and data collection approach, and provides a first analysis of the actors of electoral violence in the Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. Moreover, we highlight the dataset’s value by examining how involvement by different branches of the security forces shapes electoral violence intensity, and demonstrate that police involvement is associated with less intense violence, while paramilitary police involvement is associated with more serious violence.

Under what conditions do rebels succeed in establishing functional institutions in state-dominated areas? Canonical theories of rebel governance and state formation insist that territorial control is a necessary precondition for the development of governing institutions. Yet despite growing recognition that this claim is empirically incorrect and theoretically limiting, we lack knowledge about the conditions under which rebels succeed in governing civilians in areas where the state dominates. We argue that low state governance responsiveness towards rebel constituencies enables insurgents to overcome the challenges associated with establishing institutions in state-dominated areas. Low state responsiveness increases popular demand for insurgent institutions, decreases the costs associated with governing, and enables insurgents to collude with civilians to hide their institutions. Case studies from Ireland, South Africa, and Algeria illustrate our propositions. Our findings deepen knowledge on how rebels govern and expand their territorial reach, and shed light on alternative trajectories of state formation.

How does civilian protest shape civil war dynamics? Existing research shows that civilian protests against violence and war contribute to peace and restrain violence against civilians. There is less research on civilian protests that are at odds with peaceful conflict resolution, such as protests to salute armed actors, advocate against peace agreements, and oppose peacekeepers. This study develops a novel typology of wartime civilian protest that brings together protests to different ends, and theorizes the heterogeneous effects of protest on civil war dynamics. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence from new disaggregated and georeferenced event data from Côte d’Ivoire, the study demonstrates that—contingent on certain demands—protests were associated with violence against civilians, violence involving peacekeepers, and failed conflict resolution. These findings contribute new knowledge on how civilians shape the dynamics of civil war, and caution that nonviolent civilian action may not only be a force for de-escalation and peace.